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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal ) 
corporation. Plailztiff-Respondent, 
\Case No. 
vs. ) 11141 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Brief of Defendant-Appellant 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Salt Lake City filed this action seeking a declara-
tion of the rights and duties of the State and the City 
under an 1890 grant, and supplemental contract in 1926, 
1rhich provided that the City would furnish water for 
use on the State Capitol Grounds and in the buildings 
that have been erected on these grounds without charge 
to the State. 
In this brief, the State of Utah will be referred to 
as the State, and the Territory of Utah will be referred 
1 
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to as the Territory; Salt Lake City will be referred tu 
as the City. When the rights of the State are referrea 
to it in this brief it will include the rights acquired by the 
Territory. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LO,VER COURT 
This matter was heard before the Honorable Leo11· 
ard '~r. Elton of the Third Judicial District Court i11 
and for Salt Lake County upon a written stipulation 
of the Facts. At the hearing on this matter both the 
City and the State moved for summary judgment. The 
lower court granted the City's motion and held that 
the grant of the free use of water by the City to the 
State was null and void. The lower court concluded: 
that the grant water was void because of a lack of con· 
sideration; that the grant was in violation of the trust 
under which the City must operate its water system 
without favor or discrimination to its inhabitants; tha'. 
the grant violated the public policy of the Territory ai 
was later set forth in Art. XI, § 6 of the Utah Consti· 
tution and that the 1926 agreement was in specific 
violation of said constitutional provision; and. finally. 
that a municipality holds water rights in a sacred trust 
for the benefit of its inhabitants and this right cannot 
be lost by estoppel, !aches or adverse use. The court 
denied, without prejudice, the City's request for an 
order which would allow the Citv to collect from the 
· f ·iction. State for water delivered in a separate cause 0 ' · 
2 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant submits that the decision of the lower 
court should be reversed and that the City should be 
reriuired to deliver water to the State Capitol grounds 
and the buildings located on these grounds without any 
charge to the State. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case was submitted on an agreed stipulation 
of facts, which included three exhibits. Rather than 
reiterate the information in the stipulation in its en-
tirety, we will summarize the pertinent facts and then 
direct the court's attention to the appropriate para-
graphs of the stipulation as the argument is presented. 
When the territorial government of Utah 'i~ 
the capitol from Fillmore to Salt Lake City, the City 
conreyed 19.46 acres of land to the Territory for gov-
ermnental purposes. The State Capitol is located on 
this site. This conveyance was made in 1888 and the 
deed is attached to the stipulation of facts as Exhibit 
·x (R. 16). The grant of land also conveyed to the 
Territory a one-half interest in an additional five acres 
of ground for reservoir purposes (R. 18). One of the 
eon<litions of this deed was that the land not actually 
111ed for governmental purposes be improved and main-
tained as a public park (R. 19). That same year the 
l"iah Territorial Legislature created the Board of Com-
in:osioners on Capitol Grounds to take possession and 
3 
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control of the grounds conveyed by the City. The sum 
of $25,000.00 was appropriated and expended to im-
prove and beautify these grounds ( R. 10) . 
As a part of this same arrangement and in order 
to carry out certain of the conditions in the deed, !ht 
City also granted the State the use of water for !ht 
grounds and buildings located thereon. During the 
1890 legisbtive session the Territorial legislature en· 
acted the following legislation ( R. 11) : 
.For the improvement of capitol grounds to 
be drawn by and expended under the supervision 
of the capitol commission ... $10,000.00. 
Provided, that the above amount be expended 
on condition that Salt Lake City furnish, free 
of charge, sufficient water for said grounds and 
for the building proposed to be erected thereon. 
On May 6, 1890, the City adopted a resolution 
granting the free use of water for the Capitol grounds 
and buildings (R. 21): 
Whereas the late Legislature appropriate~ 
the sum of $10,000.00 for the improvement o! 
the Capitol Grounds with the proviso that the 
City furnish water without charge for the 
grounds and any building erected thereon. 
Be it resolved that the free use of water ~e 
granted to the Commission for the use ~f .1 e 
Capitol Grounds and for the use of any bwidi~~g 
erected thereon - in accordance with the specJ / 
understanding with the City when arrangemen \ 
were made to begin work on said grounds. 
4 
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In order to furnish water to the Capitol grounds 
aud buildings it was necessary to construct a reservoir 
:wcl pipeli::e system. The Territory participated with 
lhe City in the initial expense of constructing these 
facilities. HoweYer, the City at its own expense has 
replaced the old reservoir with steel storage tanks and 
has cleaned the water line to the Capitol grounds (R. 
12). 
In 19H the State completed construction of the 
l'tah State Capitol Building on the tract of land de-
scribed in Exhibit "A". The cost of said building was 
approximately $2,309,235.56 and an additional sum of 
$126,ti86.85 was expended for the purpose of grading, 
excarating, improving and parking the remaining land 
comed by said conveyance. Upon completion of the 
Capitol building the City immediately began the de-
livery of water to satisfy the needs and requirements 
within the Capitol building and on the surrounding 
grounds and this practice has continued up to the pre-
sent time (R. 13 and 14). 
Subsequent to the conveyance of land from the 
City in 1888 the State acquired approximately twenty 
acres of additional land surrounding the State Capitol 
building and grounds ( R. 13) . 
In 1926 the State and City entered into an agree-
ment wherein the State agreed to improve and maintain 
that portion of this additional twenty acres of land 
, which was not being used for goyernment purposes as 
5 
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a park and the City agreed that its former grant would 
extend to these lands ( R. 22) : 
THIS AGREEMENT made and entered 
into this 25th day of October, A.D. 1926, by and 
between Salt Lake City, a municipal corporation 
of Utah, and the State of Utah: 
\VHEREAS the State of Utah has acquired 
certain lands adjoining its present Capitol 
Grounds in Salt Lake City, Utah, and it is now 
the intention of the State of Utah to improre 
said land and park the same and to maintain 
the same as a part of the State Capitol Grounds. 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of 
said improvement and parking of said grounds. 
and the perpetual maintenance thereof as the 
State Capitol Grounds, said city does hereby 
agree that its former grant to the State of the 
perpetual free use of water for the Capitol 
Grounds, and the purposes for which it was used, 
shall also extend to such additional lands as shall 
be parked, improved and maintained as a part 
of the Capitol Grounds of the State. 
It is understood and agreed that the State will 
be as economical as possible in the use of the 
water upon such additional land as shall ~e 
parked and improved, and will conserve the said 
water supply by using only a sufficient amount 
to preserve and maintain the beauty of t~: 
grounds, the lawns, flowers, trees and shrubbe., 
thereof. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the partie~ 
. h d d se~h hereto have hereunto set their an s an ·b. 
the day and year first above written. Done ) 
6 
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authorilv of a resolution of the Board of Com-
missione'rs of Salt Lake City, Utah. 
* * * * 
The State is supplied with water from the City 
Creek portion of the City's water system. Over the 
vears it has been necessary for the City to expend sub-
sta11tial sums of money to provide its residents with a 
qLiality of water that would meet the health standards 
of the State of Utah and the United States Department 
uf Health ( R. 13). The State has not contributed any 
funds toward these improvements, however, no claim is 
being made in this action for reimbursement of these 
expenditures ( R. 14) . 
Since the construction of the Capitol Building in 
mu the State has constructed a number of other build-
ings on the Capitol grounds for which the City has also 
furnished water without charge (R. 14). 
The Stale has, over the years, expended large sums 
,Jmoncy to construct, landscape and improve the Capi-
tol grounds as a public park and tourist attraction. In 
addition the State expends a substantial amount of 
money annually to maintain the Capitol grounds as a 
public park ( R. 15). 
In 1960 the City made a demand on the State to 
113)' for the use of this water. The State refused to 
:::ukP payment alleging that it had no right or obliga-
::on to expend public funds for this purpose. This 
action was then filed by the City. 
7 
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In the lower court the City relied primarily 011 the 
following propositions to sustain its position: that the 
grant in 1890 was ultra vires the power of the City 
Commission; that the grant violated the common law 
0
'1 
the Territory; that if the grant was valid in the first 
instance Utah Constitution Art. XI, § 6 voided it anrl 
that this constitutional provision prohibited the 1926 
agreement; that there was no consideration for the grant 
of the free use of water; and, finally, that the affirma· 
tive defenses raised by the State are invalid. These con-
tentions will be discussed as each relates to the poinb 
of argument. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SALT LAKE CITY HAS BEEN LIMITED 
IN ITS AUTHORITY TO CHARGE THE 
STATE FOR THE WATER USED ON THE 
CAPITOL GROUNDS AND IN THE BUILD· 
INGS LOCATED ON THESE GROUNDS. 
When the Territory appropriated the $10,000.0il 
for use on the Capitol grounds in 1890 it expressly pro· 
vided that the appropriation was on the condition that 
the City was to furnish water without charge, Stipula· 
tion of Fact No. 3 ( R. 11) . The City has accepted thi~ 
condition and limitation by its action in delivering water 
f . This al<M to the State for over seventy- ive years. . ·. 
would constitute sufficient acceptance of this conrliti:'n 
8 
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ll'ithout any formal acceptance by the City Commission. 
However, the City did by formal action in 1890 and 
rnzo cxpre:-;sly accept the condition imposed upon it by 
the legislature in 1890. By imposing this condition 011 
the City the legislature limited the power of any future 
city commission to charge the State for the water used 
on the Capitol grounds and in the buildings. This legis-
lative action did not disturb the general power of the 
City to charge its inhabitants for the use of water but 
merely limited the City's power as it affected the Stair.. 
As a creature of the State the legislative authority 
om municipal corporations is plenary and virtually 
unlimited, 2 McQuillin, Municipal Corporation, § 4.03 
t:Jrd ed. 196G); Salt Lake City v. Tax Commission of 
['tah, 11 U. 2d 359, 359 P. 2d 397 (1961). Further, 
the general power of a municipality to charge for water 
, may be restricted by statute. 94 C.J.S. Waters, § 286. 
The extent of legislative authority over cities in 
this regard was discussed by the Supreme Court of 
Florida in the case of City of Gainesville v. Board of 
Control of the State of Florida, 81 So. 2d 514 (1955). 
This was an action by the City of Gainesville to deter-
mine the rights of the City and the State under a con-
tract where the City had, some forty-five years prior to 
the action, agreed to furnish water to the State Uni·-
rersity without charge as an inducement for locating 
the l'niYersity in the City. The court held that the 
City was obligated tu continue to furnish the water with-
out charge and in so doing reviewed the circumstances 
9 
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surrounding the location of the University within tlit 
City. One matter commented on by the court was tnt 
action of the Florida legislature in setting up a proct 
<lure to determine a location of certain educational j11. 
stitutions in the State of Florida and the requiremenh 
imposed on certain municipalities under what wa,. 
known as the "Buckman Act": I 
So in the Buckman Act and in Section 32j 
of the Revised Statutes of Florida, the legisla-
ture, creator of municipalities, recognized, ap· 
proved, and, at least in some instances, required 
contributions from city treasuries of monies as 
a condition to the establishment a.nd maintenance 
of institutions of learning within their borders. 
Further evidence of the attitude of the Je~s· 
lature with regard to such donations is found in 
Chapter 5498, Laws of Florida, Acts of 19Uj, 
expressly empowering the City of Gainesville to 
issue bonds for such amount as the city council 
should determine "for the purpose of securing 
educational advantages and facilities in or ad· 
jacent to such city." F.S.A. § 282.01. 
And as late as 1953 the legislature in a fo~t· 
note to Item No. 62 of the appropriation bill. 
" * * Provided that none of these monies shall 
be used to purchase water from the City .J" 
Gainesville," Chapter 28115, Laws of Flori a 
1953, F.S.A. § 282.01, item 62. Of cours.e, 11 ; 
realize that this was long after the promise 0 
the citizens' committee was made but it doei 
indicate to us that the legislative intent for~ .. 
eight vears afterwards harmonized with l~nle 
· h t t w nc1 pattern we think was set by t e ac s 0 
we have referred. 
10 
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Also compare City of East Cleveland v. Board oj' 
Ji;d11catiu11, 15'7 N. E. 5'75 (Ohio 1927). 
Limitations on the power of a city to charge for 
1rater has been sustained as valid in other cases. In the 
case of Lus Anyeles v. Los Angeles City Water Corn-
pan!J, 177 U.S. 558 (1900) the United States Supreme 
Court upheld a contract where Los Angeles City had 
leased its waterworks to a water company for a term 
of 30 years and the company was to supply water to 
the inhabitants of the city. The city agreed that this 
was to be the exclusive supply of city water. The con-
tract further provided that the city would not reduce 
the water rates below what was then being charged by 
its lessee. This contract was ratified by the California 
legislature. The court concluded that this contract was 
not a grant of the city's rate-making power but rather 
a valid limitation upon it. It was also held that the 
provisions of the new California constitution, which 
would have prohibited the city from granting certain 
of the privileges provided for in the contract, could not 
affect an existing contract. Also see New Orleans 
Waterworks Co. v. Rivers, 115 U.S. 674 (1885), and 
the case of Omaha Water Company v. City of Ornaha, 
Lli F. 1 (1906). 
The condition and limitation placed on the City by 
the Territorial legislature was valid when it was im-
posed, and applied when the parties executed the agree-
ment in 1926 and it is a valid limitation today on the 
City's power to charge the State for the use of this 
11ater. 
11 
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POINT II 
THE CITY WAS NOT ACTING ULTRA 
VIRES OF ITS AUTHORITY IN MAKING 
THE USE OF WATER A Y AILABLE TO THE 
STATE WITHOUT CHARGE. 
The City was acting within its authority to grant 
the State the use oi water free of charge even if the 
legislature had not expressly authorized such action. 
Grants of this nature have been sustained as either a 
donation or a binding contractural arrangement. 
There was nothing inherently wrong with the City 
providing the State with water free of charge as was 
concluded by the lower court. Nor did this grant in any 
way violate the public policy of the State. The action 
of the City was in furtherance of a public purpose allrl 
this is sufficient to justify not charging the State for 
the use of this water, 12 McQuillin, Municipal Corpor-
ations, § 34.104 (3rd ed. 1950): 
Discriminations in the interest of the public 
and which benefit the people generally appear 
to be favored. Perhaps no rule can be formulated 
with sufficient flexibility to apply to every case 
that may arise. As once said: "It is only when 
the discrimination inures to the undue advantage 
of one man in consequence of some injustice 
inflicted on another that the law intervenes f~r 
the protection of the latter." Discrimination~ i1l 
favor of the government or charitable i~st.1h1 • 
tions, however, have been upheld. Discnmin:' 
tions in favor of the public at large, it has bee1
1
1 
· · 1uc 1 said, are not opposed to public policy masn 
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as they benefit the people generally by relievi11g 
them of part of their burdens and consequently 
such discrimination cannot be held illegal in the 
absence of legislation upon the subject. 
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma in the case of 
F'rct;:: v. City of Edmond, 168 P. 800 (1916) specifi-
cally upheld a grant of free water to a public institution 
on the grouu<l that it was for a public purpose: 
The contention that the city has the power 
in proper case to give from the resources of its 
pubiic service plants to public institutions or 
public uses without unjustly discriminating 
against the rights of its inhabitants seems to 
be supported by reason, logic, and abstract jus-
tice. A fire originates within the borders of a 
city upon the property owned by some person 
who has never been a user of the city water. The 
fire is extinguished by water furnished by the 
city plant. Can it be said that the city is required 
to install a meter at some place upon the hose 
line in order to determine the number of thou-
sand gallons for which the owner of the property 
must pay, or that by failing so to do and giving 
the water, not only for the benefit of the private 
indiYidual, but for the benefit of the public, it 
unjustly discriminated against some person who 
has paid for all the water that he used? The 
statement of the proposition, of course, reveals 
its absurdity, and shows that the conduct of the 
city must be based, not upon absolute equality 
of service, but upon discrimination which is not 
essentially unjust. The public lavatories, rest 
roorns, public fountains, and public parks main-
tained by cities, are all places where water is 
donated for the public good. So it must seem 
13 
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that water might be given for use in the city hall 
or the city's public buildings. Does the rul~ 
extend to those institutions which are owned and 
controlled, not by the city, but by the State? We 
can see no good reason for the distinction be-
tween them, where the state institution of learn-
ing is located within the city and redounds, as 
it must both to the benefit of the business actiri-
ties of the city and to the intellectual and moral 
life of its inhabitants. The support of that insti-
tution must be for the public good. 
The case of Brummitt v. Ogden Waterworks Co., 
33 u tah 285, 93 Pac. 829 ( 1908) which is the principal 
case the City relied on in the lower court does not con· 
travene this proposition. In this decision the court was 
concerned with the City delegating its general power 
to fix rates and with the problem of prohibiting a pri-
vate benefit at public expense. This is clearly distin· 
guishable from this situation. Further, there is nothing 
in Art. XI, § 6 of the Utah Constitution which would 
require a completely uniform charge to all users of City 
water. Hence, it would not matter whether such a grant 
was made before or after the Utah Constitution was 
adopted. Therefore, the 1926 agreement is valid even 
if it is considered to be separate and distinct from thr 
1890 grant. However, it appears that the 1926 contract 
was an attempt to clarify and more clearly define the 
limits of the prior arrangement of the parties regarding 
the maintaining of the Capitol grounds as a pubhc 
park. 
In City of Gainesville v. Board of Control of the 
14 
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St 11 ie of Floi'ida, supra, the Florida court concluded 
that there was authority for the city to make such grant: 
By the express terms of the Buckman Act 
the Board of Control was given the power "to 
receive donations" and we construe this provi-
sion to authorize acceptance of donations by the 
City of Gainesville. \:Ve have been directed to 
no provision of the city charter, expressly grant-
ing to the city the power to enter such an agree-
ment as was executed by the "committee of citi-
zens." Nor has our research revealed express 
authority so to contract. 
... 1fter a careful study of this record, we con-
clude that the whole pattern for reorganizing 
and maintaining the educational system offered 
an opportunity for legal contributions by cities 
from their funds in order to secure to the citizens 
the obvious advantages of having institutions 
located in their midst. True no express grant of 
power so to contribute appeared in the Gaines-
ville charter but it was properly implied from 
the powers expressed. 
* * * * 
The donation was, in effect, one for the bene-
fit of the State, as well as the city, and was made 
to agents of the State with apparent sanction 
of the State. This, of course, would apply to any 
city offering a similar inducement. And there 
is nothing innately wrong with the donation. 'Ve 
would have to hold it of such character on the 
ground that no express power in that regard \Vas 
given and none was given from which the power 
could be implied or to which the power to spend 
was incidental. 'Ve cannot find in the historv of 
the transaction such defects or in the law ~uch 
15 
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a lack that would justify this absolute decision 
Not only do we reject this conclusion but "~ 
think the action of the legislature in dealing 
with the educational system for half a century 
manifested a sanction by that body of the action 
of the city-or on behalf of the city. 
'Ve end the discussion 011 this point by remark-
ing that in our opinion the commitment was not 
void; that it was ratified both by the city and 
the State. 
The Texas court in the City of Big Spring t', 
Board of Control, infra, had no difficulty in sustaining 
a contract in which the City of Big Spring agreed t11 
supply water to an agency of the State of Texas at a 
specified rate for as long as the State maintained a 
hospital within the city: 
Under the first point it is argued that by the 
contract the City of Big Spring surrendered its 
right to determine the rates to be charged water 
users for water; that this is a legislative or gor· 
ernmental function, and a contract which is a 
surrender by the City of such rights is therefore 
void. Cases discussing governmental functions 
of a city and its inability to delegate or surrender 
these functions are cited to sustain this point 
We have no quarrel with these cases. In the case 
we have before us the City is exercising a pro· 
prietary or business function only. In such 
capacity a city can make a contract, u~der 
authority of legislative enactment, in all tlu~g) 
as an individual or private corporation. City 
of Texarkana v. \Viggins, 151 Tex. 100. 2111 
S. W. 2d 622 (1952); City of Crosbyton ·irl 
Texas-New Mexico Utilities Co., 157 S.W. •1 
16 
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418, 420 (Tex. Civ. App., 1942, error refused, 
want of merit) ; 39 Tex. J ur. 2d 638, § 308. 
The Supreme Court of the State of Minnesota in 
an early case when presented a similar question reached 
this same conclusion. Reed v. City of Anoka, 88 N. W. 
981 ( 190~) . The Minnesota Court concluded that 
where large investments are required under long-term 
contracts of this nature, these contracts should be a 
matter of stability and not subject to the whim of each 
succeeding municipal council. The court further con-
cluded that the purpose of these contracts is not to gov-
ern but to secure for the municipality a private benefit, 
hence are business in nature and not governmental. 
i 
i 
I 
I I 
I 
At this late date all doubts concerning the author-
ity of the City to make this grant should be resolved in 
farnr of the grant being valid. As stated by the court 
in the City of Gainesville case, supra: 
The circuit judge thought there could be no 
serious contention that the city had not either 
authorized the contract in the first place, or 
ratified it when it honored the agreement for 
about fifty years. While he felt that a city could 
not be estopped to assert the invalidity of a 
contract that was ultra vires, he found that the 
fact that the municipal officials, as well as the 
members of the Board of Control, considered 
that the city was acting within its powers highly 
"persuasive to the conclusion that the City did 
have power to make the contract." 
17 
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POINT III 
THERE WAS AMPLE CONSIDERA-
TION FOR BOTH THE 1890 AND THE rn211 
GRANT OF WATER BY THE CITY AKD 
THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE CONSIDERA-
TION CANNOT NOW BE QUESTIONED. 
A. AS TO THB 1890 GRANT. 
While the 1890 grant of water can be sustained 
as a separate and distinct transaction from the grant 
of land by the City to the Territory it is submitted that 
the grant of land and water to the Territory eYolreil 
out of one transaction even though the grants were made 
in two separate documents. We direct the court's atten· 
tion to the following facts which substantiate this 
contention. 
It is apparent from the recitals in deed of the land 
and the grant of the water that the City was offering 
the land and water to the Territory to gain the finanei:d 
benefits which flow to the capitol city of the State. The 
City also secured the benefit of an additional public I 
park (R. 19). 1 
In addition to the 19.46 acres of land for goreni· I 
mental purposes, the grant of 1888 also comeyetl .. 111 
the Territory a one-half interest in an additional I 11 
acres of ground for reservoir purposes ( R. 18 I· 1 
seems apparent that the parties were contemplatii~g i;, 
use of water under this original deed. The Terntor,; 
. . 1 I I h C "t furnish1n. Legislature obvious y t 1oug 1t t e 1 y was · 
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1rater in 1888 when $25,000.00 was appropriated l.o 
eonstruct a reservoir in conjunction with the City for 
the purpose of supplying water to the grounds and 
buildings and to improve and beautify the Capitol 
grounds. .Further, the 1890 act which appropriated 
$10,000.00 for the improvement of the Capitol grounds 
was made on the express condition that the City furnish 
water free of charge ( R. 11) . 
This prior understanding concerning the City's 
obligation to furnish free water was also reflected in 
the City's resolution of May 6, 1890, wherein water wu~ 
granted for use on the Capitol grounds and any building 
erected thereon, " ... in accordance with the specific 
understanding with the City when arrangements were 
made to begin work on said grounds," ( R. 21). The 
record is clear that the grant of land and water both 
I ernlred from the single transaction of relocating the 
1 
)late capitol. 
Turning now to the matter of the consideration 
which flowed to the City by virtue of this relocation. 
We admit that this is somewhat of a unique contracl, 
i l:ut that does not make in invalid. It is rare indeed that 
1 a state government moves its capitol from one city to 
another. Some of the background surrounding this 
transaction is briefly reflected in the recitals of the 
:ieed conveying the original 19.46 acres to the Territory 
I i: 1888 (R. 16). However, suffice to say, the Territorr 
\ ~,~il tl~e City reache~ a~ accord concer~ing the reloca-
. · n of the state capitol m Salt Lake City. 
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Certainly the benefits the City received for relocat-
ing the state capitol within its boundaries was ample 
consideration for the grant of the land and the water. 
Salt Lake City's purpose in making the land and water 
available to the Territory of Utah was to secure tbc 
financial benefits which flow to a capitol city of a state. 
The rewards to the City have been numerous am! i11-
clude new residents, tourist trade, substantial state pay-
rolls and periodic state expenditures of funds for capi-
tal improvements; as well as the construction and mai11-
tenance of an additional public park within the city. 
There is a recent decision from the Supreme Cuuri 
of the State of Texas which is factually almost identical 
with this litigation and the Texas Court deals with a 
number of the questions which have been raised in thh 
litigation. City of Big Spring v. Board of Control, :J8~ 
S. vV. 2d 523, Court of Civil Appeals of Texas (19ti.51: 
404 S.W. 2d 810, Supreme Court of Texas (1Dtiti1 
One of the matters considered in this case was thr 
matter of consideration under this type of contract. 'l'hr 
City of Big Spring sought a declaratory judgment 
against the State of Texas to determine the rights of 
the parties under a certain contract wherein the c1h 
had agreed to furnish water to the Big Spring's Statr 
Hospital, an agency of the State of Texas, at a rate"' 
ten cents per thousand gallons. The contract prorideil 
that the quantity would not exceed three hundred thou· 
d ld · 1 ·is tl1
1 
sand gallons per day an wou contmue as ong '· 
state, in good faith, maintained and operated the ho'· 
pital on a site within the city. The contract was cuten 
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\ 
into in 1938 and the parties had performed under it 
since that time. The city complained that the contract 
11 as costing it money in recent years because the cost oi 
treatment antl distribution of water had increased sub-
stantially since 1938. The cost of water to the city for 
<lelirery to the hospital during the period 1960-1964 
was 33.75 cents per thousand gallons. The Texas cou.rt 
took cognizance of the fact that the state had spent in 
excess of 18 million dollar establishing the hospital 
facilities and had a payroll of approximately $91,000 
per month. The court considered these items to be a 
substantial benefit to the City of Big Spring and suffi-
eient consideration for the contract. After reviewing 
the circumstances of that transaction and expenditures 
made by the state, the Texas Court found: 
I 
The State has paid a valuable consideration 
for its contract right to purchase water from the 
City, to-wit, the establishment and maintenance 
of the hospital since the late 1930's. Its accept-
ance of the benefits under the contract makes 
the City's obligation to furnish water needed 
by the State a subsisting and binding obligation. 
Guadalupe-Blanco River Authority v. City of 
San Antonio, 145 Tex. 611, 200 S.,V. 2d 989 
( 194<7) . See also Pace Corp. v. Jackson, 155 
Tex. 179, 284 S.,V. 2d 340 (1956); Portland 
I 
I 
Gasoline Co. v. Superior Marketing Co., 150 
Tex. 533, 243 S.W. 2d 823 ( 1952) ; Landley v. 
Norris, 141 Tex. 405, 173 S.,V. 2d 454, 148 
A.L.R. 555 (1943). 
\ 
1 
The facts of the above case are entirely analogous 
,n this situation and the rule announced above should 
l1f d t . · e ermmative here. 
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However, if this court determines there was a nee<l 
for some independent consideration to support the mu 
grant of water, there was a specific monetary considera-
tion for this grant. The legislature in 1890 appropriated 
$10,000.00 for the improvement of the Capitol grounds 
on condition that the City execute this grant, Stipula-
tion of Fact No. 3 ( R. 11). Also, the State has con-
tinued to expend substantial amounts of money to im-
prove and maintain the Capitol grounds as a public park 
in reliance of the 1890 grant, Stipulation of Fact Nos. 
12 and 13 (R. 15). But the point here is, there wa.1 
consideration for this grant and the adequacy of it can· 
not be questioned at this time. This is fundamental 
contract law. 
The general rule that the adequacy of the 
consideration is immaterial has been undoubted 
ever since the concept of consideration began to 
be developed. 17 Am. J ur. 2d, Contrac'ts, § 10! 
p. 446. 
Also see 1 Corbin on Contracts, § 127. 
There is absolutely no basis upon which to con· 
elude that there was a lack of consideration for tbe 
grant of water in 1890, and the present City Comm~· 
sion has no power to rescind this contract. 
B. AS TO THE 1926 CONTRACT. 
The 1926 agreement specifically provided that the 
free use of water was extended to the additional ]and) 
. · · · the 
which had been acqmred by the State adJ01nmg 
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present Capitol grounds in consideration of the improve-
ment and maintenance of said lands as a public park. 
There is no doubt but what the City received sub-
stantial benefits under the 1926 agreement. The en-
largement of the public park around the Capitol makes 
it a raluable asset to the City. The State has spent in 
excess of $350,000.00 in constructing, improving and 
maintaining the entire Capitol grounds as a public park 
md tourist attraction (R. 15). This park attracts thou-
sands of visitors annually, many of whom are residents 
of the City. The Daughters of the Utah Pioneers 
)luseum has been constructed on this later acquired 
land and receives approximately 200,000 visitors an-
nually (R. H). This surely results in many direct and 
' indirect financial benefits to the City. 
It is costing the State approximately $40,000.00 
annually to maintain the Capitol grounds as a public 
park (R. 15). This is a continuing benefit to the City 
rnd will remain an obligation on the State as long as it 
maintains the seat of state government on these 
grounds. The benefits to the City under this arrange-
ment are substantial and sufficient to sustain this agree-
ment, 1 Corbin on Contracts, § 121 and 122. 
It is no answer to this propositiou to state that 
I 
:iie1e grounds would have been maintained in any event. 
Whether Utah would be enjoying the extensive aml 
:ttraf·ti\'e Capitol grounds it now has may be question-
Jhle. But the fact is that the City bargained for this 
• ''l<litional public park and the State has performed 011 
\ 23 
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this agreement. After receiving the benefits undo, ' 
d [JI,· 
agreement for all of these years the City should not nirn · 
be allowed to disclaim its legally incurred obligations. 
POINT IV 
IN THE ALTERNATIVE IT IS sumrn 
TED THAT THE GRANT OF WATER m, 
THE CITY CAN BE SUSTAINED AS cm .. 
VEY ANCE OF A PORTION OF THE CITYi 
WATER RIGHT. 
The legislature in granting Salt Lake City lb 
charter in 1888 empowered the City to sell, lease, conrn 
or dispose of property both real and personal for tlit. 
benefit of the City, Utah Compiled Laws of 1888, li: ! 
X, § 306. There is nothing in the record to indicate U1,: I 
this particular source of water was at the time of tl:t ! 
conveyance being devoted to public use or was needcJ 
to meet the reasonably foreseeable demands of the Ci!: 
Indeed this water was apparently surplus to the City· 
needs and as such could be sold. 10 McQuillin, M1111ir1 
pal Corporations, § 28.38a (3rd ed. 1966). Also set, 
§ 28.43 for transfer of property for a public use. fur . 
ther, the law usually indulges in presumptions iu fari': 
of the authority of a municipality to convey and 111' 
leITality of a conveyance. 10 McQuillin, Municipa/Cl' , 
v~rations, § 28.47 (3rd ed. 1966). This court has e: 1'' i 
concluded that city may dispose of a public utilitY "'11 '1' 
it is in the best interests of the City to do so. McDoiw 1 
v. Price, 45 Utah 464, 466, 146 Pac. 550 (1915). 
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The resolution setting forth this conveyance u~c:s 
the 1rnrd "grant" and this is generally sufficient to con-
rcy an interest in real property. 
The word "grant" is of very general use as 
a word of conveyance. It has lost its restricted 
meaning at common law and is at the present 
date effectual to convey an estate in a corporeal 
hereditament. 6 Thompson on Real Property 
§ 3130 (Replacement 1962). 
This principle was noted by the Supreme Court of 
Oklahoma in the case of Higgins v. Oklahoma City, l 27 
P. 2d 845 (1937): 
"Grant" and "conveyance" are words often 
used interchangeably and either is sufficient as 
an operative word in the deed to pass title to a 
present state. 
It seems clear that the City at the time it made this 
grant intended to pass a permanent vested right to the 
use of this water to the State. 
Further, the grant was sufficiently definite to 
i L~nstitute a valid conveyance of a water right. The 
r place where the water was to be used was abundantly 
11 dear. This included the Capitol grounds and buildings, 
1" nothing more is needed in this regard. The nature of 
use is also adequately spelled out. The water was to 
~used for the irrigation of the Capitol grounds in 
f' 
11rder that they may be maintained as a public park and 
11 ;or the domestic requirements of the various state office 
1"Jt]dings which were to be constructed upon this 
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ground. The City obviously knew the point at whicn : 
the water was to be diverted and the quantity requireu. • 
as it has been delivering the water for many years. 
As a matter of water law the fact that a water 
right does not set forth an exact quantity of water doei I 
not def eat the right. This court has sustained a frac-
tional apportionment of water between users whm 
no specific quantity was given as not being indefinilr 
and uncertain, Argyle v. IJ;Jitchell, 59 Utah 263, 20i 
Pac. 542 ( 1921). This principle has also been marlt 
abundantly clear in the case of Indian Reservatiom. 
The United States Supreme Court has held that when 
the government reserved land for the Indians it im· 
pliedly reserved sufficient water to carry out the pur· 
poses of the reservation, Arizona v. California, 373 CS 
546 ( 1963) . In this case the court found it proper Ir• 
determine the quantity of water allowed under lltr 
water right based on evidence other than the document 
which created the right. The above case is not set ou! 
for the purpose of urging any reservation concept bul 
rather to demonstrate that there is nothing impropt: 
in determining the quantity of water under a speciti' 
water right based on extrinsic evidence, rather than tnr 
limited language of the document creating the rign.I 
Any ambiguity concerning the extent of the grant If, 
1890 was clarified by the 1926 agreement between tcr 
h f h
. 1 tt contricl parties. This was t e purpose o t is a er ... 
· ff1c1e1• 
The fact that the City has been supplymg su ·· 
f 75 
]eares 1' 
water for State purposes or some years ' , 
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doubt that both parties understood what quantity of 
water was conveyed. 
Further, this conveyance is not defective simply 
betause it is evidenced by a resolution. This question 
1 11as presented to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the 
. : sth Circuit in the relatively early case of 1lf organ v. I 
t \ Juhnson, 106 F. 452 ( 190.1). In that case t~e ~ity of 
t • Denm attempted to rescmd a deed by which it had 
uy motion conveyed certain real property to an indi-
ridual some 18 years before the action arose. The court 
15 u1 sustaining the conveyance stated that, under such 
:c mcumstances, it would have to find an insurmountable 
n· legal hurdle before it could be induced to disturb 
l!· Jcfendant's possession . 
. S 
POINT V. 
en! THE ADOPTION OF THE UTAH CON-
ou: )TITUTION DID NOT APPLY RETROAC-
bul Ti\'ELY TO VOID THIS GRANT. 
1ptI 
cin( 
i tht 
ighl 
In the lower court the City relied heavily on Utah 
lo111t. Art. XI, § 6 to avoid the consequences of its 
~nor corrunitment to furnish water to the State. This 
1t \r, ·~·lion prohibits a municipality from directly or in-
1 thr :rectly selling or disposing of its water rights. We 
racl ~re pointed out above that this constitutional provi-
ic;er,· 
11 
does not apply to the facts of this case. However, 
es 1· addition the grant here inYolved was made in 1890 
'
1 
1 
the constitution was not adopted until 1896. It 
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is a well-accepted general rule that constitutional pro-
visions only operate prospectively unless it is clear 
there was a contrary intention. The United States 
Supreme Court spelled this concept out in the rela-
tively early decision of Shreveport v. Cole, 129 U.S. 
36 (1889): 
Constitutions as well as statutes are construed 
to operate prospectively only, unless, on the face 
of the instrument or enactment, the contrarr 
intention is manifest beyond reasonable doubt. 
This court enunciated this same rule in the case of 
Mercur Gold Mining & Milling Co. v. Spry, 16 Utah 
222 ( 1898) shortly after the Utah Constitution was 
adopted: 
Constitutions, as well as statutes, should oµ· 
erate prospectively only, unless the words em· 
ployed show a clear intention that they shoulu 
have a retrospective effect. This rule of con· 
struction as to statutes should always be adherer! 
to, unless there be something on the face of the 
statute putting it beyond doubt that the leg1~· 
lature meant it to operate retrospectively. Cou· 
ley, Const. Lim. p. 73; Suth. St. Const. ~ .J.fiH· 
465. 
This same principle has been applied to constitutional 
amendments, McGrew v. Industrial Commission, 911 
Utah 203, 85 P. 2d 608 (1938) and Snow v. Keddiny· 
ton, 113 Utah 325 195, P. 2d 234 (1948). 
The very language of the constitution makes i: 
clear that the above quoted section was only to opera!t 
prospectively. The section discusses water right ... ·· 
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now or hereafter to be owned or controlled by it." 
This language evidences only a prospective intent. It 
would certainly be an unsettling propositoin to find 
out that all pre-constitutional rights were in jeopardy 
where constitutional prohibitions were enacted. 2 Suth-
erland, Statutory Construction, § 2201 (3rd ed. 1943) 
discusses the evil of applying laws retroactively. 
Retrospective operation is not favored by the 
courts, however, and a law will not be construed 
as retroactive unless the act clearly, by express 
language or necessary implication, indicates that 
the legislature intended a retroactive application. 
The rule is the converse of the general principle 
that statutes are to operate prospectively and 
is founded on judicial premonition that retro-
active laws are characterized by want of notice 
and lack of knowledge of past conditions and 
that such laws disturb feelings of security in past 
transactions. 
The kinship between ex post facto laws and 
civil retroactive laws is likewise recognized, and 
since the ex p9st facto provision is limited to 
criminal statutes, protection from improper 
retroactivity has been included within the due 
process clause. 
The City seeks to reap the benefits of one con-
stitutional provision and ignore the remainder of this 
important document. The City's position gives the 
impre~sion that there was one set of rules prior to 1896 
and another set after. We do not argue that what con-
~titution prohibits cannot be allowed, but we do not 
heliere there was any intent to disrupt vested rights. 
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In fact Utah Const. Art. XXIV, § 1 spells just !ht 
opposite intent: 
In order that no inconvenience may arise, br 
reason of the change from a Territorial to ~ 
State Government, it is hereby declared that all 
writs, actions, prosecutions, judgments, claim~ 
1 
and contracts, as well of individuals as of bodie, 
corporate, both public and private, shall con· 
tinue as if no change had taken place; and all 
process which may issue, under the authoritr · 
of the Territory of Utah, previous to its admi;. 
1 
sion into the Union, shall be as valid as if issued I 
in the name of the State of Utah. 
This provision makes it clear that the rights ac· l 
quired by the State under the 1890 grant continue1l 
It is further provided in Utah Const. Art. XIX; I 
that: 
All institutions and other property of tht 
Territory, upon the adoption of this Constitu· 
tion, shall become the Institutions and proper~ 
of the State of Utah. 
To apply this constitutional provision retroactively 
as contended for by the City would be an impairme11! 
of contract under Art. I, § 10 of the United State' 
Constitution. Rights acquired under the legislation ii 
a territory are subject to Art. I, § 10 of the l'uiteil 
States Constitution against impairment of contrac:, 1 
The United States Supreme Court so held in the c:i'· j 
of TValla Walla City v. Walla Walla U1 ater Compan I 
172 U.S. 1 (1898). This was an action bytbewat,c 
company to enjoin the city from erecting waterworo' 
f Wad' pursuant to a city ordinance. The Territory o 
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iugfo11 incorporated the City of 'Valla 'Valla and gave 
it the power to provide a water supply for its inhabi-
tants and to grant the use of city streets for the purpose 
of laying pipes to furnish water to the residents of the 
city. The terms of such a grant could not exceed twenty-
tire years. Pursuant to this legislation the city granted 
the water company the right to lay and maintain water 
lines and supply water to the city for a twenty-five year 
period. The city also agreed that it would not main-
tain a water system of its own during this time. The 
contract had been in force for about six years when the 
city enacted an ordinance to construct its own water 
supply system. The court found that the city was 
bound by the provisions of its prior contract and this 
contract was protected by Art. I, § IO of the United 
States Constitution. Also see Los Angeles v. Los 
A 11gelcs Cit.I/ TV at er Company, supra, and New Orleans 
Waterworks Co. v. Rivers, supra, on this point. These 
cases make it clear that the constitutional protection 
<'gainst impairment of contracts applies to public con-
tracts. Also see 16 Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law, 
: Hl. The above cited cases also make it clear that it 
111akes no difference whether the impairment occurs by 
itatute or under a state constitutional provision. 
POINT VI. 
THE STATE HAS ACQUIRED THE 
~IGHT TO THE USE OF THIS 'VATER UN-
DER THE DOCTRINE OF ADVERSE POS-
IESSION. 
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If the court were to determine that the prior gr:: 
of the City was invalid, the State is still entitled 
the use of this water under the doctrine of adverse pn:i 
session. Ever since 1890, the State has had posses~i,,: 
and use of a sufficient quantity of water for the Capit, I 
grounds and the buildings located thereon. The U; 1 
has been made under a claim of right, exclusive of al I 
other rights and has been used continuously witl1uul 
interruption, openly and notoriously to plaintiff ar,
1
1 
all the world for more than 7 5 years. Such use is sutt:I 
cient to establish a right. Hammond v. Johnson,~' 
Utah 20, 66 Pac. 2d 894 (1937). We are awareth11 
the Utah Legislature in 1939 terminated the poi' I 
bility of acquiring any further rights to water unael 
this doctrine, Section 73-3-1, U.C.A. 1953, Howerer 
any right which had vested prior to that time was nu 
affected by this enactment. Therefore, the State' 
entitled to the quantity of water which it was bent· 
ficially using as of 1939. 
While it is generally considered that properr 
held by a municipal corporation for a governmenti 
purpose cannot be acquired by adverse possession, tberi 
is authority which holds that other municipal pro~er~ 
may be lost by adverse use. 10 McQuillin, 1Uumt1fr 
Corporatiom, § 28.55 (3rd ed. 1966). 
The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon es I 
. · hts 11' j pressly held that a city can lose its water rig , ·. 
. t B " . 299 p, :JI I adverse possession, Ebell v. City o a ·e1, 
(1931): I 
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The statute of limitations runs against the 
dty in its proprietary or busines capacity. Phil-
lips Y. Leininger, 280 Ill., 132, 117 N.E. 497, 
498. A city can lose its water rights by adverse 
possession and user by another, amounting to 
prescription. 3 Kinney on Irrigation and Water 
Rights (2d ed.) p. 2599, § 1441. The power to 
provide a water system is not governmental or 
legislative in character, but strictly proprietary, 
and the city engaged in the prosecution of such 
an improvement and selling water for gain is 
clothed in such authority and subject to the same 
liabilities as a private person. Tone v. Tillamook, 
58 Or. 382, 386, 114 P. 938; Twohy v. Ochoco, 
108 Or. I, 40, 210 P. 873, 216 P. 189, and cases 
there cited. 
POINT VII. 
AT THIS LATE DATE THE CITY SHOULD 
XOT BE ALLOWED TO QUESTION THE 
l'ALIDITY OF ITS GRANT OF WATER TO 
THE STATE. 
A. ESTOPPEL. 
Under the fundamental principles of equity, the 
City should now be estopped to deny the validity of 
its prior grant of water. We have already pointed out 
I 
the f ~cts and circumstances surrounding the exec~tion 
of tlus grant. The City should not now be permitted 
I '.0 ta~e an inconsistent position regarding its author.ity 
\ ir raise technical objections concerning the execution 
\ VI the document after the State has relied to its detri-
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ment on the City's action. Their prior representatimi-
are now a bar to the present claims. Large sum.
1111 
• 
money have been expended by the State to construe'. 
buildings and improve and maintain the grounds,,. 
cording to the terms of the grant and with the full/ 
knowledge of the City. · 
Nor is there any doubt that the doctrine of estoppti 
applies to a municipal corporation under this type 11'. · 
grant. This Court in the case of JV all v. Salt Lake Cit.11 • 
50 Utah 593, 168 Pac. 766 (1917), specificallyallowe1 1 
this defense against Salt Lake City. In the Wall cast.• 
I 
the City attempted to disavow a prior conveyance nt · 
land. The court found that the city council after a corn· 
plete investigation had authorized the conveyance anl 
that the plaintiff had relied on the conveyance to !lie 
extent of lending money on the property. Under thN 
circumstances, it was held that the city was 0011 
estopped to deny its former action: 
We believe, as was said by the court in Ci~ 
of Sullivan v. Tichenor, supra, cited by app~1 
lant, that: 
"A municipal corporation can no more.pr?f.iJ~1:' 
fraud upon property owners than,,an md11 1 •• 
and mav be estopped by conduct. · 
Or, as :aid by Judge Dillon, in note one to~-
. b d f . t tl1e chan1c.c section a ove quote , re ~rrmg o I· 
of acts necessary to constitute an estoppe · 
I 
The principle of estoppel in pais has heen .·.: 
I th eJeme1. ' plied to exceptional cases w 1ere e b , t 
calling for its exercise appear to have eeo ·· 
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abandonment of the public use for the prescrip-
tive period, inclosure and expensive improve-
ments, such as large and costly buildings, or acts 
of ihe municipality inducing the abutter to be-
lie\C that there is no longer any street, and the 
expenditure of money in reliance upon the acts 
of the municipality. The absolute bona fides of 
the abutter or adverse possessor is a most impor-
tant factor where an estoppel in pais is claimed. 
The acts relied on must be of such character as 
to amount to a fraud, if the city were permitted 
to claim otherwise. 
We hold that this case falls within the excep-
tional class of cases ref erred to by Judge Dillon, 
and that it is the duty of the court to decide it as 
"right and justice require." It is our opinion 
that the city is estopped from claiming the pre-
mises in question as a public street. 
This same concept was expressly stated by the 
court of civil appeals of Texas in the case of City of 
Bir1 S prinu, supra: 
Eve11 if the Contract is invalid, we are of the 
opinion that the City is in no position to com-
plain. It is estopped to do so under the plainest 
principles of equity. In Boiles v. City of Abi-
lene, 276 S.,V. 2d 922, Eastland C.C.A., writ 
ref., it was held that the City could not repudiate 
the obligations of a Contract on the ground of its 
partial invalidity while retaining its benefits, the 
Court saying: "It is the settled law that a muni-
cipal corporation is estopped to deny the validity 
of a contract where it exacts performance from 
the other party and accepts the benefits accruing 
to it therefrom." 
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B. LACHES. 
Salt Lake City is certainly in no position to questior 
the form or substance of the 1890 grant. By wait:no: 
' some _10 years t~ raise these questions, the City is u11.j 
questionably gmlty of laches and lack of diligenct 1 
Although some authorities hold that the doctrine o! 1 
laches does not apply to a municipal corporation, mam 
hold to the contrary. This Court in the case of Sa/1; 
Lake City v. Investment Company, 43 Utah 181, IJJI' 
P~c. 603 ( 1913_), has ~xpressly ~e~o~ize~ that the dGr· 
trme of laches is applicable to cities m tlus state: i 
It is also a well-recognized rule that all tl1t ( 
consequences of notice, laches, and lack of dili·' 
gence apply to a municipal corporation with tP.: 
same effect that those matters do to prirate cor 
poration or individuals. 
The question of whether laches applies to a par· 
ticular situation should be determined from the fact' 
of the particular case and whether injury has resulteil 
10 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, § 49.09 (or1 
ed. 1966). There is no doubt that the State has relie'J I 
on this grant of water and would be injured if the gr:in I 
were not upheld. The City is guilty of unreasonaoJ, /, 
delay in bringing this action and as a matter of eqwi:, 
should now be barred from questioning its prior graut i 
I 
POINT VIII. . J 
ANY CLAIM FOR PAYMENT THAT T~~ I 
CITY HAD FOR THE VALUE OF WAT I 
36 i 
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\rHICH IT HAS DELIVERED TO THE 
ST.ATE IS NO'V BARRED BY THE STATUTE 
OF LIMITATIONS. 
If the City ever had a valid claim for payment for 
the rnlue of the water which it has historically delivered 
to the State for use on the Capitol grounds that claim 
1s now barred under the provisions of Section 78-12-
25, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. This section provides 
that an action for claims of this nature must be com-
menced within the four years after the cause of action 
accrued. Over seventy-five years have elapsed since the 
I City entered into the arrangement to deliver water to 
I the State. 
Limitations of actions are generally applicable to 
a municipality when it is acting in its business or pro-
prietary capacity. This rule is stated in 17 McQuillin, 
.1Iunicipal Corporations, § 49.06 (3rd. ed. 1968), as 
follows: 
:,.I It is generally held that the statute of limita-
tions may be interposed as a defense in an action 
,,; I of a municipal corporation to enforce rights held 
ir I by it in its private or corporation capacity. 
ik I . Also see the Oregon case of Ebell v. City of Baker, 
1
·' ! ~U9 Pac. 313 ( 1931), where this same rule was found 
111 i :o be applicable. 
CONCLUSION 
I 
. I 
It, I The grant of water by the City for use on the State 
'~ \ Capitol grounds and the buildings located on these 
i 37 
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grounds is a valid and binding obligation on the Citv 
In accordance with the terms and provisions of tk 
grant the City should be required to continue to deliver 
sufficient water for use on the Capitol grounds anl 
in the buildings without charge to the State. 
Dated this 21st day of March, 1968. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
DALLIN '"·JENSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
State of Utah 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
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